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Abstract 
In this paper we document the extent and reach of state capitalism around the world 
and explore its economic implications.  We focus on governmental provision of capital 
to corporations – either equity or debt – as a defining feature of state capitalism.  We 
present a stylized distinction between two broad, general varieties of state capitalism: 
one through majority control of publicly traded companies (e.g. state-controlled SOEs) 
and a hybrid form that relies on minority investments in companies by development 
banks, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and the government itself.  We label 
these two alternative modes Leviathan as a majority investor and Leviathan as a 
minority investor, respectively.  Next we differentiate between these two modes by 
describing their key fundamental traits and the conditions that should make each mode 
more conducive to development and superior economic performance.   
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Introduction 
After over two decades of extensive state reform and privatization, state 
capitalism still looms large in developed and developing countries. State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), development banks, public pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, 
among many other vehicles of governmental capital, have taken center stage in the 
global economy. For example, in 2005 there was no single state-owned enterprise 
among the top 10 firms of the Fortune Global 100 list, which ranks companies by 
revenues. In 2010, there were four SOEs among the top 10: Japan Post Holdings, 
Sinopec and China National Petroleum (two of China‘s national oil companies), and 
State Grid (a Chinese utility).1  
Many observers view these developments with apprehension.  Bremmer (2010) 
raises concerns about what he refers to as ―state capitalism‖ and describes it as 
antithetical to the ideals of liberal capitalism. It is, he wrote, ―a system in which the state 
functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets primarily for political gain― 
(Bremmer, 2010, p. 5). A summit of founders and CEOs of some of the world‘s top 
companies in the world, organized by Harvard Business School, identified state 
capitalism and its support for ―national champions‖—private or state-owned firms 
chosen to receive government assistance—among the ten most important threats to 
market capitalism (Bower, Leonard, & Paine, 2011). 
                                                 
1 All lists taken from the Fortune Global 500 list web page, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/, accessed on March 3, 2012.  
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Governments, particularly in emerging markets, have justified the rise of such 
forms of hybrid capitalism as a way to solve market failures. Private companies, in 
contrast, see the rise of new SOEs, firms with minority government ownership, and 
private companies backed by loans of development banks as threats because 
governments may use these competitors to influence markets (e.g. dictating their 
pricing strategies) or provide them with privileged access to resources unavailable to 
private enterprises.   
Whether we regard them as benign or pernicious, we know very little about 
those new forms of government intervention: the various institutional mechanisms by 
which states exercise control, why state capitalism reemerged and in which form, and 
its effects on both firm performance and state governance. Moreover, we lack a 
conceptual framework to understand state capitalism in a more nuanced and detailed 
way. Although in the last decades there has been a flurry of research comparing state 
versus private ownership (see, for a review, Megginson & Netter, 2001), the stylized 
view of state ownership usually involves state majority control.  More recent discussions 
of the mechanisms of state capitalism, on the other hand, fail to provide a consolidated 
theoretical framework for the varieties of state capitalism, the distinguishing traits of 
those various forms, and their efficiency implications. 
In this paper we document the extent and reach of state capitalism around the 
world and explore the economic implications of these new forms of state capitalism. We 
define state capitalism as the widespread influence of the government in the economy, either by 
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owning majority or minority equity positions in companies or through the provision of 
subsidized credit and/or other privileges to private companies.  We present systematic, cross-
country evidence showing that the form of state capitalism prevailing in the twenty-first 
century is different from what we observed in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Then, state involvement in enterprises took the form of command economies or mixed 
economies in which governments owned a large number of enterprises and directly 
controlled the allocation of strategic resources. More recently, perhaps paradoxically, 
the privatization and liberalization wave of the 1980s and 1990s helped create a new 
form of hybrid capitalism where the government influences the investment decisions of 
private companies through minority capital. 
 Thus, we present a stylized distinction between two broad, general forms of 
state capitalism: through majority control (e.g. state-controlled SOEs) or in a more 
hybrid fashion through minority investments by development banks, pension funds, 
sovereign wealth funds and the government itself.  To use Williamson‘s (1985) 
expression, those forms represent two alternative organizational modes to carry out 
business allocations where the state is present.  We label these two alternative modes 
Leviathan as a majority investor and Leviathan as a minority investor respectively. 2   
The paper then reviews several theoretical perspectives that have been proposed 
to explain the emergence of each mode of state capitalism.  Next we differentiate 
between the majority and minority investor model by describing their key fundamental 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, the discussion in The Economist, special issue on state capitalism (Wooldridge, 
2012). 
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traits and the conditions that should make each mode more conducive to development 
and superior economic performance.  We conclude by outlining several suggestions for 
future research to improve our understanding of the functioning and economic 
implications of the various forms of state capitalism. 
The State of State Capitalism around the World 
After almost three decades of privatization in developed and developing 
countries, state capitalism still looms large. The outcomes of those privatizations were 
not necessarily a general strip-down of the state‘s productive assets. In the end, 
privatizations faced intense political opposition and in specific strategic sectors 
governments themselves decided that it was better to keep certain companies under 
state control. Bortolotti and Faccio‘s (2009) survey of SOEs in OECD countries reveals 
that, despite strenuous efforts to privatize, governments were still controlling a large 
share of the privatized firms.  Except for the capital goods sector, transportation, and 
utilities, the share of firms under government control did not go down between 1996 
and 2000 in that set of rich countries. If at all, the privatization process seems to have 
been more thorough in Mexico, New Zealand, Turkey, the UK, and the US.  
An OECD report (Table 1) showed the importance of SOEs in member countries, 
particularly those in which Leviathan acted as a minority owner (OECD, 2005). In 
France and Italy, the assets of SOEs represented over 25 percent of GDP, while in 
Finland this ratio reached 80 percent. In Korea and Turkey this figure was also around 
20 percent of GDP. Moreover, OECD governments have minority positions in about 25 
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percent of the companies that have the government as a shareholder (See Table 1). In 
Germany, over 50 percent of the federal government‘s equity holdings in companies 
that are considered SOEs are minority positions (and that does not include companies 
with less than 25 percent of government ownership). In Denmark, Finland, France, the 
Netherlands, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Spain over 30 percent of the companies 
that are identified as state-owned have the government with a minority position only.3 
Table 1. Number of State-wned Enterprises With Government Minority Positions in 
OECD Countries, 2005 
  Number of SOEs  Minority positions % of minority-owned firms 
Australia 12 0 0% 
Austria 78 21 27% 
Belgium 15 0 0% 
Canada 100 15 15% 
Czech Republic >1,000 >120 12% 
Denmark 27 10 37% 
Finland 55 19 35% 
France 100 33 33% 
Germany 37 20 54% 
Greece 50 14 28% 
Italy 25 4 16% 
Japan 77 n.a n.a 
Korea 30 4 13% 
Netherlands 44 16 36% 
New Zealand 34 3 9% 
Norway 26 6 23% 
Poland 1,189 691 58% 
Slovak Rep. 115 55 48% 
Spain 40 15 38% 
Sweden 58 7 12% 
Turkey 39 n.a n.a 
United Kingdom 80 14 18% 
Source: All figures are estimates by the authors using the OECD (2005). Polish data comes from Waclawik-Wejman 
(2005). 
                                                 
3 OECD (OECD, 2005, p. 34). It is difficult to know how much control the government of these 
countries has with minority positions because in some of the privatizations these governments kept 
minority positions but with golden shares, i.e., shares that give the government veto power over certain 
decisions. For further discussion on the complications to ascertain the share of equity that belongs to a 
government, see Bortolotti and Faccio (2009). 
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Table 2 Patterns of State Ownership in Emerging Markets, c. 2010  
  
SOE 
output to 
GDP (non-
financial) 
Listed 
SOEs a 
SOE as % 
of market 
capitali-
zationb 
Number of SOEs 
with majority control 
Num. of firms in 
which the federal 
government has 
minority 
ownership   
Federal State/local 
Brazil  30% 14 34% 247 
 
397 
China 29.7% 942 70% 17,000 150,000 n.a. 
Egypt n.a.   57d  59 
India 13.1% 29 4014% 217 837 404 
Indonesia 2%c 16 29.5% 142 
 
21 
Malaysia 
 
15 36% 52 
 
28 
Mexico 3%   205   
Poland 28% 
  
498 
 
691 
Russia* 20% 12 40% 7964 250 1418 
Singapore 12% 12 20% 20 
  South Africa    270   
Thailand 26% 6 21% 60 
  Turkey 14%   74 700 67 
Vietnam 33.7%   1805 1559 1740 
Notes:  a, b These estimates include companies under government control and those with minority 
ownership. 
C For Indonesia this figure represents the total net profits of SOEs relative to GDP. 
d For Egypt, the number of SOEs is for 2005 but the number of minority-owned firms are for 2002. 
Source: See Appendix. We include all firms with government ownership of over 10% for minority 
shareholdings and over 50% of the votes (i.e., control) to consider it a majority-controlled SOE.   
 
In Table 2, we see that governments of emerging markets also hold minority 
positions in a large set of firms. In most of the countries for which we found data, the 
Leviathan as a minority investor mode is prevalent and covers about 20-30 percent of 
the companies in which the government has equity (the rest being fully owned SOEs). 
This table also shows that among emerging markets, SOEs still contribute a large 
portion of GDP and they represent a good portion of total stock market capitalization 
(close to 30 percent on average). 
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Figure 1 Distribution of the Number of Government Equity Holdings in Publicly 
traded Companies in BRIC Countries, 2007. 
 
Source: Created by the authors from Capital IQ and company web pages using a sample of the largest 150 
publicly traded companies in these markets.  
 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC), the largest emerging markets, display the 
same pattern of ownership we find in other parts of the emerging and developed 
world—that is, a mix of majority and minority ownership. In Figure 1 we show the 
distribution of ownership using a database of the largest 150 publicly traded companies 
(by market capitalization) between 2005 and 2009. Leviathan acts most often as a 
minority shareholder in Brazil and Russia, followed by India, where the government, or 
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one of its holding companies (e.g. The Life Insurance Corp. of India), holds minority 
positions in a variety of firms. In China we see a greater bias towards large ownership 
stakes in publicly traded companies, but we still find some minority shareholdings.  
These minority stakes mostly occur through holding companies that are fully controlled 
by the government and that then invest in a variety of firm.  Furthermore, as we discuss 
below, governments not only act as shareholders but also provide credit to firms 
through development banks and state-owned banks. 
How can we make sense of this varied configuration of state ownership?  Next 
we propose stylized modes of state capitalism and then discuss alternative theoretical 
explanations for their emergence. 
Modes of State Capitalism 
Economists have usually juxtaposed state capitalism and either liberal market 
economies or free markets in general. Ludwig von Mises, one of the most influential 
Austrian economists, equated state capitalism with socialism or ―planned economy‖ 
(von Mises, 2009, first published in 1951).  Murray N. Rothbard (1973, p. 419), a central 
figure in the American libertarian movement, went even further by contrasting state 
capitalism with free-market capitalism: ―The difference between free-market capitalism 
and state capitalism is precisely the difference between, on the one hand, peaceful, 
voluntary exchange, and on the other, violent expropriation.‖  Moreover, for Rothbard 
(1973), the cozying up of big business with the government was also a manifestation of 
state capitalism.  Therefore, these two libertarian scholars equated state capitalism with 
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government intervention in markets; central planning; with governments favoring big 
business; and even with the outright expropriation of private property. 
Bremmer‘s (2010) provides the beginnings of a conceptual framework for 
understanding various degrees of state involvement in the economy. He distinguishes 
state capitalism from ―command economies‖ involving planning and state-led resource 
allocation, and ―free-market economies‖ featuring minimal governmental intervention 
(e.g. along the lines of securing property rights and establishing stable rules for private 
investment).  He defines state capitalism as a system in which 
…governments use various kinds of state-owned enterprises  to manage the exploitation 
of resources they consider the state‘s crown jewels and to create and maintain large 
numbers of jobs. They select privately owned companies to dominate certain economic 
sectors. They use so-called sovereign wealth funds to invest their extra cash in ways that 
maximize the state‘s profits. In all three cases, the state is using markets to create wealth 
that can be directed as political officials see fit. And in all three cases the ultimate motive 
is not economic (maximizing growth) but political (maximizing the state‘s power and 
the leadership‘s chances of survival). (Bremmer, 2010; p. 4–5) 
 
All those definitions, however, lack nuance. Bremmer, for instance, treats state 
capitalism as a general mode of capitalism, juxtaposed to an idealized form of liberal 
market economy in which the government does not intervene in the running of 
corporations or the allocation of credit.  Consistent with Bremmer, we conceptualize 
state capitalism as a system where the government has a marked influence in the 
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business sector.  We, however, advance the extant discussion by dichotomizing state 
capitalism into two broader classes (Figure 2).4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Varieties of State Capitalism: Alternative Modes of Organization 
Closer to the more familiar view of state capitalism as a process involving 
outright state management, the state can act as a majority shareholder and manager of 
SOEs—a mode we refer to as Leviathan as a majority investor. According to Ahroni (1986), 
SOEs are firms in which the state has ownership and control. SOEs are also 
conceptualized as enterprises; that is, they should effectively produce and sell goods and 
services. These companies should be distinguished from government entities in charge 
                                                 
4 Our work thus contributes to the evolving literature on the varieties of capitalism (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Schneider & Soskice, 2009).  We however focus on state capitalism and its varied forms, 
which has not been studied in detail by that literature.   
Leviathan as a 
majority 
investor  
(e.g. state-run SOEs, 
state-owned 
holding companies 
- SOHCs) 
Leviathan as a minority investor 
 
 Partially privatized firms (PPFs). 
 Minority stakes under state-
owned holding companies 
(SOHCs) 
 Loans and equity by state-owned 
and development banks. 
 Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). 
 Other state-controlled funds (e.g. 
pension funds, life insurance). 
 
 Privately-
owned firms 
State capitalism 
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of providing public services (such as courts, the police, Social Security, or National 
Health Services), which often do not have a corporate form and depend directly on 
orders from government officials.  
In the Leviathan as a majority investor model, the government usually exercises 
control of SOEs indirectly, by appointing managers and boards of directors. In some 
SOEs, however, ministers act directly as presidents.  Moreover, SOEs can be fully 
owned by the government or they can be publicly traded, as long as the government is 
the majority shareholder.  Governments also exercise their control as a majority investor 
using large companies as conglomerates controlling a series of firms or through what is 
known as state-owned holding companies (SOHCs).   
The state can also influence the economy in an indirect way, acting as a minority 
shareholder and lender to private firms. This is the mode we refer to as Leviathan as a 
minority investor. This more nuanced form of state capitalism is a hybrid form, which 
mixes features of full state control and private operation of enterprises. As we saw in 
the previous section, however, minority state participation in corporations is an 
increasingly worldwide phenomenon and is not uniform. We argue that there are 
several channels through which states exercise minority control, such as holding shares 
in partially privatized firms (PPFs); minority stakes under state-owned holding 
companies; loans and equity by state-owned and development banks; sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs); and other state-controlled funds (e.g. pension funds, life insurance).  We 
discuss each in turn. 
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Leviathan as a majority investor 
As is clear from Tables 1 and 2, both in developed and emerging markets 
governments all around the world own and control a large number of state-owned 
enterprises. In most cases SOEs are firms that ―survived‖ the wave of privatization, 
generally in sectors deemed by governments as ―strategic.‖  
The so-called National Oil Companies (NOCs) are a typical example. NOCs are 
energy companies in which governments usually have either full ownership (e.g., 
Aramco in Saudi Arabia or Pemex in Mexico) or at least control (e.g., ENI in Italy; 
Statoil in Norway; Sinopec in China, Petrobras in Brazil, or Gazprom in Russia). Those 
firms in which governments have control but not full ownership are usually publicly 
traded.  Some current SOEs also resulted from previously privatized companies which 
were subsequently ―nationalized‖—as is the case of Russia‘s state-owned gas company 
Gazprom. 
As noted before, governments also use pyramidal structures of ownership or 
state-owned holding companies (SOHCs) to manage their ownership in a large number 
of firms. For instance, Gazprom is actually a pyramid with majority equity shares in 
Gazprom Neft (73.02%), JSC "TGC-1" (51.79%), and JSC Latvijas Gaze (53.56%), among 
others.  In China, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) works as a holding company, overseeing over 100 additional stand-alone 
companies and holding companies (Lin & Milhaupt, 2011).  The government of Dubai 
also organizes all of the companies it controls under the umbrella of two large SOHCs: 
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Dubai World and Investment Corporation of Dubai (ICD). Additionally, the ruler of 
Dubai, Mohammed bin Rashid had under his command Dubai Holding, another SOHC. 
These holding companies controlled a series of subsidiaries and two sovereign wealth 
funds: Dubai World controlled Istithmar World and Dubai Holding controlled Dubai 
International Capital. 
Leviathan as a minority investor: more than what meets the eye 
Because investors, analysts, companies and multilateral organizations all around 
the world do not fully understand the reach of Leviathan as a minority investor, usually 
there are surprises or misunderstandings surrounding the role governments play when 
they use minority investments in corporations or when they support private (and 
public) companies through loans from development banks and other sources of 
funding.  We describe below the various channels through which governments can act 
in the minority investor mode. 
Partially privatized firms (PPFs).  PPFs result from particular features of 
privatization programs whereby governments decided to preserve a foothold in the 
governance of privatized companies—oftentimes with the objective to invite private 
management while at the same time keeping privatized firms as ―national champions‖ 
influenced by governmental policies (Bremmer, 2010).  Governments can, in addition, 
hold ―golden shares‖ in PPFs granting special power to veto certain decisions. PPFs are 
also observed in cases where governments helped acquirers with state-backed equity, or 
converted previous loans into minority shares to rescue failing privatized firms.  
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Minority stakes under state-owned holding companies (SOHCs).  In other cases 
governments also create ―pyramidal‖ SOHCs to handle minority stakes in various 
sectors. That is, holding companies operate as portfolio managers for the government.  
For instance, in emerging markets examples of this range from Khazanah Nasional 
Berhad in Malaysia to SASAC in China. Malaysia is an extreme case in terms of 
consolidating the management of state equity under the umbrella of one big holding 
company. In 2010, Khazanah Nasional Berhad owned stock in 52 companies, out of 
which it held minority positions in about 26 of them, in sectors ranging from financials, 
transportation, and utilities.5 
Loans and equity by state-owned banks and development banks.  Because those banks 
have been used extensively as sources of long-term capital to private firms (Armendáriz 
de Aghion, 1999), it is natural that they will have a role in the governance of those firms.  
Although the liberalization and privatization reforms of the 1990s reduced the scope of 
development banks in some countries, in several cases banks were preserved and even 
strengthened.  Lazzarini, Musacchio, Bandeira-de-Mello and Marcon (2012) identified 
286 development banks throughout the world as of 2011, chiefly concentrated in South 
and East Asia (29.7%), Africa (24.5%), and Latin America and the Caribbean (17.8%) 
(Table 3).  With the global financial crisis of 2008, even in the United States there have 
been calls to create a development bank supporting large infrastructure projects. 
 
 
                                                 
5 All of the data for Khazanah comes from the 2010 annual report, available at 
http://www.khazanah.com.my/, accessed on January 10, 2012. 
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Table 3. Number of Development Banks around the World (2011) 
 
 Development 
agencies 
General 
develop-
ment banks 
Special-
purpose 
development 
banks 
Commercial 
banks with 
development 
objectives 
Total, 
by 
region 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Africa 3 26 21 20 70 
North America   1  1 
South and East Asia 13 23 22 27 85 
Eurasia  8 2 9 19 
Europe  7 3 2 12 
Latin America/ Caribbean 4 29 17 1 51 
Middle East  1 3 3 7 
Oceania 1 5 5 4 15 
Regional/Global  20 5 3 28 
Total, by type 21 119 79 69 288 
Source: Lazzarini, Musacchio, Bandeira-de-Mello and Marcon  (2012).  Note on the classification scheme: 
A. Development agencies: includes investment authorities, training centers, and organizations that provide technical assistance to specific sectors, 
but that do not specialize in giving out loans. 
B. General development banks are those focused on providing loans for or investing in the equity of industrial and/or infrastructure projects. It 
includes also banks that provide guarantees so that industrial or infrastructure projects can get private funding. They can be regional, such as the 
Inter-American Development Bank, or domestic, such as the Korea Development Bank. 
C.  Special-purpose development banks are those financial institutions specialized on credits to agriculture, small and medium enterprises, or the 
construction industry. That is, we include banks that want to promote construction and housing developments for families who could not get 
mortgage loans from regular banks. This category can include agricultural banks like The Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural 
Credit, from Egypt or The Land Bank of the Philippines, or banks with broader objectives such as the National Housing Bank of India. 
D. There are many banks that we classify as commercial banks with some development objectives because these banks, public or private, operate 
as regular banks, but tend to have one part of their portfolio focused on specific sectors that the government is targeting. Examples of this are 
Azerigazbank in Azerbaijan, the Banco de Desarrollo Productivo in Bolivia, and the Bhutan National Bank Ltd, in Bhutan. 
 
 
For instance, Brazil‘s development bank (BNDES) not only acts a lender, but also 
as a minority shareholder through a specialized private investment arm, BNDESPAR. 
The role of BNDES as a conduit of state influence, jointly with other local public 
investors such as pension funds of SOEs, is clearly illustrated by Vale, the third largest 
mining company in the world.  When in 2009 President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva 
publicly pressured Vale to invest in local steel mills and buy Brazilian ships, investors 
were confused. Vale was supposed to be a private company and yet the Brazilian 
government was acting as if it was a utility or a SOE under its control.  In reality, Vale 
was partly privatized in 1997 when a consortium headed by private owners, BNDES, 
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and pension funds bought Vale‘s controlling shares and created a controlling entity, 
Valepar.  Although BNDES and the pension funds individually had minority stakes, if 
they voted in block they had more than 50% of controlling shares.  After much public 
debate and after taking a lot of criticism and pressure from the Brazilian government, 
Vale‘s private shareholders eventually acquiesced and, in April of 2011, the board of 
directors dismissed its CEO, Roger Agnelli.  
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).  With the rapid dissemination of SWFs as an 
alternative way to channel country savings into investments with higher return and 
risk, minority shareholding positions in publicly listed companies have increasingly 
become targets for those funds. The majority of the investments of these funds, 
however, are done outside the home country because the idea is to precisely keep a pool 
of savings in foreign currency-denominated assets. In particular, many sovereign 
wealth funds are designed to diversify the investment of national foreign exchange 
reserves into assets other than US or European government bonds. 
Some of these SWFs also invest in companies in their home countries.  China 
Investment Corporation (CIC) buys shares (minority positions) in China‘s companies 
and banks. Temasek, Singapore‘s SWF invests 32% of their portfolio locally, in 
companies such as Singapore Technologies Telemedia, Singapore Communications, 
Singapore Power, Singapore Airlines, and others.6 Mubadala, a sovereign wealth fund 
from Abu Dhabi, invests heavily in large development projects at home in energy, 
                                                 
6 Data from http://www.temasekreview.com.sg/portfolio/major_companies.html, accessed on 
May 17, 2012. 
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telecommunications, health care and other sectors.7 The Abu Dhabi Invesment 
Authority, one of the largest SWF‘s in the world, in contrast, does not invest in its home 
country, the United Arab Emirates. 
 
Table 4. Largest Sovereign Wealth Funds by Assets under Management (AUM) 
Fund 
AUM in 
 US$ billions 
Government Pension Fund - Global (Norway) 431 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (UAE) 395 
China Investment Corporation (China) 332 
Kuwait Investment Authority (Kuwait) 295 
Gov. of Singapore Investment Corporation (Singapore) 185 
Temasek Holdings  (Singapore) 133 
National Wealth Fund (Russia ) 87 
Qatar Investment Authority (Qatar ) 70 
Libyan Investment Authority (Libya ) 64 
Source: Musacchio and Staykov (2011), Exhibit 2. 
 
 
Other state-controlled funds (e.g. pension funds, life insurance).  In India, the Life 
Insurance Corporation (LIC) plays the role of large holding company for the 
government. LIC is the largest active stock market investor in India, with around $50 
billion invested as of September 2011. The government controls LIC and selects its 
board and management teams. It often directs LIC to invest in the shares of SOEs, 
especially when demand in the IPO of these firms is low. However, LIC and the 
government have also been seen to disagree publicly on some occasions. Our 
computations indicate that, through LIC, the government of India, as of 2012, invested 
                                                 
7 Information from Mubadala‘s web page, http://mubadala.ae/portfolio/, accessed on May 17, 
2012. 
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in about 25 companies, mostly in minority stakes, which represent about 4% of the total 
stock market capitalization of the country.    LIC is usually a passive investor.  Yet, 
when the government directs it to buy shares in partial privatizations, those 
investments underperform the market in a significant way.8 
In Brazil, pension funds of SOEs, whose management is influenced by 
governments, have minority shareholding positions in several publicly traded firms 
and often behave as active investors influencing the strategy of firms and even fostering 
mergers of firms in which they have common stakes (Lazzarini, 2011) – as is illustrated 
by the case of Vale, discussed earlier.   
In sum, all these examples indicate that this more hybrid form of state capitalism 
occurs in cases where governments provide capital to private enterprises while at the 
same time relinquishing majority control. In all of the institutional forms described 
above, influence by the government, if any, is more indirect.  Governments can 
participate in coalitions of owners (―control blocks‖) to influence the governance of 
firms; or they can allocate loans or equity conditional on firms pursuing certain 
desirable state objectives.9  We next present alternative explanations for the existence of 
those various forms of state capitalism and then more directly contrast their particular 
                                                 
8 This is based on an analysis of the investments LIC made in the privatization (divestments) of 
NPC, NMDC, SJVN, Engineers India, Power Grid Corporation, the Shipping Corporation of India, PTC 
India Financial Services, and ONGC. LIC had a cumulative loss of 24% in this investments by April 2012 
(Vaidyanathan & Musacchio, 2012).  
9 This hybrid mode of state capitalism should also be distinguished from hybrid public-private 
partnerships crafted to execute specific infrastructure projects or public services such as water supply, 
transport, prisons, and so on (Bennett & Iossa, 2006; Cabral, Lazzarini, & Azevedo, 2010). In our 
conception of hybrid state capitalism—Leviathan as a minority investor—, governments participate in 
corporations that can expand into several sectors instead of being focused on a particular public domain. 
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traits and conditions that should make each form more conducive to superior economic 
performance.  
Why Does State Capitalism Exist? 
Several explanations have been advanced to account for the emergence of state 
capitalism. While some arguments take a more benign stance—i.e., governmental 
involvement in the economy helps solve market failures (the industrial policy view) or 
pursue societal objectives that diverge from pure profit-maximizing goals (the social 
view)—other arguments adopt a more negative view by emphasizing the distortions 
brought by political interference through governmental capital (the political view). Still 
other authors interpret the propagation and resilience of state capitalism in a more 
neutral fashion, as a result of complex historical processes and inherited institutional 
conditions (the path dependence view). We next discuss each of these views in detail. 
Industrial policy view 
The industrial policy view sees the provision of state capital as an important tool 
for solving market failures leading to suboptimal productive investment. Two major 
sources of market failure are commonly identified. The first has to do with capital 
markets. In poorly developed financial markets, investment is severely constrained 
(Levine, 2005), especially when firms need to undertake large-scale projects with long 
maturity. Governments can thus act as lenders or venture capitalists in conditions 
where private sources of capital are scarce. Indeed, a large literature on development 
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banking proposes that state-owned banks can alleviate credit constraints in the private 
sector and promote projects with positive net present value that might otherwise not be 
undertaken (Bruck, 1998; Yeyati, Micco, & Panizza, 2004). Moreover, in economies with 
significant capital constraints, governmental funding can alleviate capital scarcity and 
promote entrepreneurial action to boost new or existing industries (Armendáriz de 
Aghion, 1999; Cameron, 1961; Gerschenkron, 1962).   
The second source of market failure involves coordination problems. Thus, 
governmental involvement may alter the nature and path of productive investments, 
especially when a given regional context is subject to externalities across industries and 
activities (Krugman, 1993; Marshall, 1920). Investing in a processing plant, for instance, 
will be more attractive for private owners if raw materials and efficient transportation 
infrastructure are available at low cost. Hirschman (1958) famously proposed that 
backward and forward linkages in the production chain will have to be created to spur 
local development. Following this logic, a ―big push‖ by the government may be 
necessary to promote coordinated, complementary investments (Murphy, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1989; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). 
Such coordination problems will be magnified in a context of shallow capital 
markets: were private capital abundant, governments could simply incentivize the 
emergence of new sectors through differential tax regimes or temporary protection. 
However, under conditions of capital scarcity, direct or indirect provision of state 
capital may be beneficial to foster complementary investments. In his in-depth analysis 
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of Brazilian industrialization, Trebat (1983) concludes that SOEs were instrumental to 
industry-level development in a context of scarce capital markets: ―Public enterprise has 
been considered in Brazil as a shortcut to industrialization—an expediency forced upon 
policymakers by the absence of a well-financed domestic private sector and by Brazil‘s 
reluctance to allow transnational corporations into certain strategic sectors‖ (p. 116). 
Yet this discussion fails to account for the many and varied institutional forms of 
state capitalism. Governments may boost complementary investments by creating SOEs 
(with majority control) in multiple sectors. However, they may also relinquish control 
to private firms and provide equity through development banks or state funds. Still in 
other cases, private firms themselves may create alliances to spur joint investment and 
access foreign capital and resources through global production chains (Coe, Dicken, & 
Hess, 2008; Pack & Saggi, 2006).  In other words, although the industrial policy view 
helps explain the role of state capitalism in addressing market failure, it does not 
explain why in some cases Leviathan is a majority investor, while in others Leviathan 
acts more indirectly through non-controlling shares or targeted lending, i.e., as a 
minority investor.   
Social view 
The social view asserts that state-influenced firms pursue a ―double bottom line.‖ 
That is, they will have ―noncommercial‖ objectives that go beyond profitability or even 
contradict the simple principle of shareholder value maximization (Ahroni, 1986; Bai & 
Xu, 2005; Shapiro & Willig, 1990; Toninelli, 2000). In the words of Shirley and Nellis 
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(1991, p. 17), ―noncommercial objectives include the use of public enterprises to 
promote regional development, job creation, and income redistribution; they often 
involve taking on or maintaining redundant workers, pricing goods and services below 
market (sometimes even below costs), locating plants in uneconomic areas, or keeping 
uneconomic facilities open.‖ Governments may also determine the cost of inputs, set 
wage ceilings, subsidize interest rates, or give SOEs investment funds at preferential 
interest rates. Thus, according to the social view, corporations controlled by the state 
will emerge as a way to pursue social objectives in corporate decision-making—such as 
high employment or low prices—by reducing the pressure to maximize profits. 
Similarly, this freedom from shareholder value maximization means that state 
capital can pursue long-term goals that may be unpalatable to private investors seeking 
quicker returns (Kaldor, 1980). Private investors may reduce their shareholdings or 
even exit the firm in case of unsatisfactory short-term performance. Some projects, 
however, may deliver effective results only in the long-term, and a more ―patient‖ 
source of capital may be necessary to withstand periods of market turbulence. 
Governments can therefore act as ―a financial partner‖ committed to supporting 
valuable projects with relatively long timelines (McDermott, 2003, p. 22). Musacchio 
and Staykov (2011), for instance, argue that a key feature of SWFs is their long-term, 
patient orientation. These funds, the authors argue, ―are also more immune to ‗animal 
spirits‘ and could more easily withstand market panic…‖ In addition, ―without any 
short-term pressure to return a significant portion of assets in cash to their 
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governments, SWFs could afford to stay in their investments during market troughs‖ 
(p. 7).  
Therefore, in the social view, state capitalism will deliberately attenuate the high-
powered profit-based incentives of private capitalism. A reduced emphasis on profit 
maximization in the public sector is aligned with Williamson‘s (1999) analysis of public 
versus private governance. He introduces the concept of probity: the need for ―loyalty 
and rectitude‖ (p. 322) in various domains such as ―foreign affairs, the military, foreign 
intelligence, managing the money supply, and, possibly, the judiciary‖ (p. 321). 
Williamson (1999) argues that low-powered incentives in the public sector guarantee 
probity by avoiding excessive ―resource deployment from cost savings‖ (p. 325). In 
similar vein, Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) stress that public organization will be 
desirable when profit-maximization causes an excessive emphasis on cost reduction at 
the expense of ―quality‖ (e.g. effective student learning in schools). Although 
Williamson (1999) and Hart et al. (1997) do not focus on the state ownership of 
corporations, their propositions are consistent with the social view. In this sense, state 
capitalism may emerge as a way to ―tame‖ the profit-based, short-term motivations of 
markets. 
Like the industrial policy view, however, the social view does not explicitly 
account for the variation in state capitalism discussed earlier. Arguably, governments 
will more easily prompt managers to pursue social goals if they have majority control—
i.e. if they can veto decisions that conflict with their desired objective to avoid excessive 
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unemployment or high prices. However, it is also possible that, through minority 
stakes, governments will be able to have some degree of influence. The long-term 
orientation of SWFs, discussed before, is an example. Governments may also try to 
convince other owners of PPFs to follow social objectives, and those owners may 
acquiesce to governmental interference as a way to preserve their interests in PPFs or 
receive future benefits (e.g. continued provision of state capital). We will further 
elaborate on this issue in the subsequent discussion. 
Political view 
While the industrial policy and social views see governmental influence and the 
attenuation of high-powered market incentives as benign or even beneficial, the 
political view underscores their resulting inefficiencies (Chong & Lopez-de-Silanes, 
2005; La Porta & López-de-Silanes, 1999; Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Thus, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998, p. 10) contend, ―the key problem of state firms is government 
interference in their activities to direct them to pursue political rather than economic 
goals.‖ Politicians and politically connected capitalists may extend their ―grabbing 
hand‖ to divert public resources for their own benefit, with negative consequences for 
corporate performance. Political interference in SOEs can result in excessive 
employment or the selection of employees on the basis of political connections instead 
of merit or background, and those employees will typically lack the high-powered 
incentive contracts commonly found in private corporations (e.g. bonuses or stock 
options). Thus, SOEs that suffer from too much political intervention may end up 
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making poor choices in product mix and location. They may fail to cut costs and 
streamline their operations in periods of crisis, and they may pursue inefficient, 
unprofitable investments to placate the pressure of governments.  
This problem is aggravated by the so-called soft budget constraints of state 
corporations (Kornai, 1979; Lin & Tan, 1999). With abundant and ―patient‖ capital from 
the state, bureaucrats will be more likely to approve bad investments, and use public 
funds to cover existing losses or rescue failed projects. Lacking the pressure of market 
investors towards profitability, SOEs can be more effectively used as sources of cheap 
capital to meet the political objectives of governments and politicians. The political view 
diverges from the social view in regarding the low-powered market incentives of public 
governance as a critical downside. The resulting inefficiencies will be more acute 
depending on the extent to which political meddling distorts corporate decision-
making.  
Although political interference is arguably more intense in SOEs with majority 
state control, the political view also explains certain types of interference that may occur 
when Leviathan is a minority investor, i.e., in the hybrid mode of state capitalism. 
Namely, public-private connections may be conduits of cronyism: a mechanism through 
which ―those close to the political authorities who make and enforce policies receive 
favors that have large economic value‖ (Haber, 2002, p. xii). In the political view, 
governments provide capital to firms not to channel funds to socially efficient uses, but 
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rather to maximize their personal objectives or engage in crony deals with rent-seeking, 
politically-connected industrialists (e.g. Faccio, 2006; Kang, 2002; Krueger, 1990).    
A recent literature has found empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis 
that financing can be influenced by political factors such as election cycles and 
campaign donations (e.g. Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; Dinç, 2005; Sapienza, 2004). 
The implication is that governments provide capital to firms in return for political 
support—either through campaign donations to the government‘s political coalition, or 
investment decisions that benefit politicians and their constituencies. And firms may 
request subsidized credit or cheap (minority) equity even in cases where projects could 
be normally funded and launched using private sources of capital.  The potential for 
cronyism also arises in the creation of ―national champions‖ (Falck, Gollier, & 
Woessmann, 2011). That is, politicians and officials explicitly pick certain private firms 
to receive funds, either debt or equity, as a way to propel them to consolidate their 
sectors and grow. On the one hand, the creation of national champions is consistent 
with the more benign industrial policy view asserting that state capital can solve market 
failures thwarting industrial development. On the other hand, some argue that the 
criteria governments use to select particular firms over others are not clear and have 
sometimes been linked to political objectives (Ades & Di Tella, 1997). National 
champions may therefore be another manifestation of governments‘ desire to influence 
the private sector to pay political dividends (Bremmer, 2010). 
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Consistent with this political view and our earlier discussion on PPFs, several 
authors submit that some governmental influence remains even after firms are 
privatized.  Bortolloti and Faccio (2009) find that, after 2000, governments of OECD 
countries kept some degree of control in 62.4% of their privatized companies.  
Examining privatization events in transition economies, Pistor and Turkewitz (1996) 
observe that while private companies with state ownership ties benefit from ―state-
granted insurance‖ (p. 217), ―the presence of the state as an owner has given it some 
leverage in influencing certain decisions, such as energy prices or the closure of 
factories in regions with high employment‖ (p. 231).  Bennedsen (2000) offers a game-
theoretic mode where one of the equilibria involves private capitalists acquiescing to 
state directives (e.g. avoiding excessive layoffs) in return for subsidies.  The 
implications of post-privatization business-government ties are also examined by 
Boyko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) and Kauffman and Siegelbaum (1996).   
Therefore, while political interference may explain the desire to create SOEs, it 
also helps explain the emergence of hybrid (minority) state capitalism. Outright 
political influence through governmental fiat power is substituted for a more indirect 
and nuanced influence, often through crony ties. In the words of Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994, p. 998), ―there is no magic line that separates firms from politicians once they are 
privatized.‖10     
                                                 
10 Focusing on the Chinese case, Nee and Oppen (2007) describe what they call ―politicized 
capitalism,‖ characterized by complex interactions between governments and private actors.  However, 
while the authors see politicized capitalism as a situation of ―disequilibrium‖ (p. 96), we submit that 
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Path dependence view 
The path dependence view explains both the emergence of—and variation in—
state capitalism as a result of idiosyncratic, country-level institutional features and 
historical processes. At a fundamental level, path-dependent processes occur because of 
complex interactions among political and economic actors who will try to preserve their 
interests in the face of imminent change (North, 1990). The defining event in the recent 
evolution of state capitalism has been the privatization programs of the last few decades 
of the twentieth century. Most countries around the world followed a common path in 
the ascent of state capitalism in earlier decades, but the process of privatization and 
divestiture of government-owned corporations has been uneven. The result is 
considerable variation in the way the state owns companies and intervenes to prop up 
private companies (i.e., national champions). Many aspects of the path dependence 
view are consistent with the political view, which emphasizes the mutual benefits that 
government and business actors derive from their continued connections with one 
another. However, while the latter underscores the inefficiencies of state capitalism, 
path dependence theorists tend to take a more neutral perspective, highlighting how 
state capitalism may simply be a manifestation of country-level persistence of certain 
fundamental institutions and complex social interactions.11 
                                                                                                                                                             
political exchanges have been at the realm of the hybrid state capitalism, which has been a more or less 
stable form in several countries. 
11  For good surveys of the history and resilience of SOEs as central features of the capitalist 
system of Western European countries, see Toninelli (2000) and Millward (2005). In the chapters of 
Toninelli (2000) there are detailed histories of the rise and fall of SOEs in Italy, Germany, France, Spain, 
Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. For a review of state presence in Brazil since the 
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Stark‘s (1994, 1996) examination of market transition in East European countries 
is an example of uneven and incomplete privatization.  Compiling data from newly 
privatized firms in Hungary, Stark (1996) reveals that they remained partially owned by 
state actors (Hungary‘s State Property Agency and the State Holding Corporation), and 
that these actors also participated in numerous top Hungarian firms jointly with private 
and foreign owners.  He notes that ―ironically, the agencies responsible for privatization 
are acting as agents of étatization‖ (p. 1001).  He refers to this process as a recombination 
of public and private resources drawing on existing routines, practices, and social ties in 
the economy.  Given that these ―local‖ features tend to be country-specific, this view 
suggests not only that ownership relations will be heterogeneous across countries, but 
that the importance of the state will great vary according to inherited conditions (e.g. 
Bebchuk & Roe, 1999).  ―A new social order,‖ writes Stark (1994, p. 65), ―cannot be 
created by dictation—at least not where citizen themselves want a voice in determining 
the new institutions.‖ 
A related argument is that the feasibility of privatization will depend on local 
ideology and attitudes towards public or private ownership (Durant & Legge Jr., 2002; 
Hirschman, 1982); and that governments will try to take those considerations into 
account when designing reform policies.  Anticipating negative public reactions 
associated with privatization programs, governments may involve domestic owners 
                                                                                                                                                             
nineteenth century see Musacchio (2009) and for the specific case of railways see Duncan (1932). Also 
consistent with path dependence, some authors have explained ownership patterns according to the legal 
origin of the country (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). However, these authors do 
not discuss state ownership in detail. 
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and state agencies in the execution of those programs, while at the same time infusing 
state capital in the newly privatized companies as a way to signal to the public that the 
government remains present in the economy (Kuczynski, 1999).  Negative public 
reactions against privatization can be especially acute when SOEs are sold to large 
capitalists and foreign owners.  For instance, in line with Stark‘s (1996) findings, the 
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) not only coordinated the whole privatization 
program, but also kept minority stakes in several companies (Inoue, Lazzarini, & 
Musacchio, 2012; Lazzarini, 2011). De Paula, Ferraz and Iooty (2002, p. 482) argue that 
mixed consortia involving foreign, private, and state actors in Brazil helped to ―dilute 
political criticisms that often accompany the transfer of privatized assets to foreign 
entities.‖ 
Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco (2004) also emphasize heterogeneity in the 
extent to which governments privatized SOEs, measured as total privatization revenues 
to GDP for 1977-1999. They find that privatization varied across countries according to 
three factors. First, they find that the fiscal situation of the government, when the 
privatization programs started, determined the urgency to privatize SOEs. Second, the 
level of financial market development (measured as market capitalization to GDP and 
the stock market turnover ratio) also determined the feasibility of mass privatization 
programs as it facilitated share issue privatizations. Third, these authors find that 
authoritarian governments have a harder time privatizing.12 Thus, local political 
                                                 
12 It is not clear that this result holds for developing countries, where nondemocratic 
governments carried out some of the most thorough privatization programs. Moreover, recent evidence 
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regimes—which tend to be very resilient—also seem to determine the extent of 
governmental ownership.  
In sum, the path dependence view offers new insights on the prevalence of 
Leviathan as a majority investor and, perhaps more importantly, on the emergence of 
the hybrid mode of state capitalism with Leviathan as a minority investor. In the path 
dependence view, hybrid state capitalism will naturally result from existing rules, ties, 
and ideologies that existed prior to reform programs. With the transfer of assets to 
private owners, the state may remain partially disseminated in the economy as a way to 
preserve previous connections with the productive sector or to minimize public 
opposition towards reforms. Viewed from a different angle, a lower incidence of state 
capitalism may also be explained by a favorable ideological position by political parties 
towards more liberal markets, as is the case of Mexico or Chile (see e.g. Bremmer, 2010, 
p. 122). 
Figure 3 shows that state capitalism does have strong path dependence, even 
after decades of privatization. In this figure we plot the percentage of SOE output to 
GDP for a series of countries that were classified as mixed economies in 1980 (such as 
Germany, France, and Brazil) and economies that were considered command economies 
(such as China, the Czech Republic, and Russia).  It is clear that in more recent years, 
SOEs are still more important in former command economies. 
                                                                                                                                                             
from India shows that the government delayed privatization in regions where the governing party faced 
more competition from the opposition (Dinç & Gupta, 2011). 
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Figure 3. SOE Output to GDP c. 2010 in Former Command and Mixed Economies 
Source:  Data from Table 1 matched with data from the appendix of World Bank (1995). Former command economies 
include China, the Czech Republic, Finland, India, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic, and Vietnam. Former mixed 
economies include Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and Turkey. 
 
Furthermore, countries in which the state had a larger presence in the economy 
in 1980 tend to have governments with more SOEs in general and more minority 
investments in corporations in later years. Figures 4 and 5 depict these relationships in 
simple scatter plots.   Figure 4 shows SOE output to GDP circa 2010 in former mixed 
economies and former command economies. Former command economies tended to 
preserve a heavier presence of the state in the ownership of corporations today. We 
interpret these positive correlations as evidence consistent with the path-dependence 
view.  Consistent with Stark (1994, 1996), former socialist countries in Easter Europe 
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tend to have the largest presence of Leviathan both as a majority and as a minority 
shareholder. 
 
Figure 4. SOE Output to GDP in 1980 vs. the Number of Federal SOEs per Million 
People (circa 2010)  
Source: See Table 1 and Figure 3. 
 
There is also strong path-dependence when it comes to the number of companies 
in which the government has minority ownership and the level of SOE output to GDP 
in 1980. Figure 5 shows that this correlation is high and that the countries in which 
Leviathan acts more as minority shareholder are also former command economies (e.g., 
Eastern European countries, Russia, Finland). 
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Figure 5. SOE Output to GDP in 1980 vs. the Number of Companies with the 
Government as a Minority Shareholder per Million People (circa 2010) 
Source: See Table 1 and Figure 3. 
 
Varieties of State Capitalism: Features and Performance Implications 
We now consolidate the previous theoretical discussion in a comparative 
framework describing key attributes of each variety of state capitalism and its 
implications for the performance of firms and social welfare. For the sake of 
comparison, we also consider features of private ownership. As indicated in Table 5, we 
identify four general traits that should greatly differ across modes: the extent to which 
each mode creates agency problems (i.e. managers whose goals are misaligned with firm-
level objectives); the resulting state capacity to coordinate and enforce societal objectives in 
the economy; the observed level of cronyism defined by the extent to which political 
connections yield private companies favors from the government; and the rigidity of 
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allocations in the economy, indicated by the degree to which new, entrepreneurial firms 
enter the system while old, inefficient firms exit. We next describe these traits in more 
detail. 
Table 5.  The Modes of State Capitalism in Comparative Perspective 
 
Leviathan as a 
majority investor 
Leviathan as a 
minority investor  
Private 
ownership 
Agency problems  within 
firms 
HIGH MODERATE LOW 
State capacity to 
coordinate the economy 
and attain social goals 
HIGH 
 
MODERATE 
 
LOW 
 
Potential for (public-
private) cronyism 
MODERATE HIGH LOW 
Flexibility of allocations 
(ease of entry and exit) 
LOW MODERATE HIGH 
 
Agency problems  
The problem of delegating decisions to agents whose objectives may not be 
aligned with those of principals has been long discussed by agency theorists (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The remedies for principal-agent misalignment normally involve 
performance-contingent incentive contracts for managers, direct monitoring by 
principals, or a combination of both. Those remedies are far more difficult to implement 
in SOEs than in privately owned firms. Thus, incentive contracts usually work best 
when there are objective, readily observable performance metrics such as profits or 
share prices (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). However, as suggested by the social view, 
governments often add social objectives in the management of SOEs, and this may lead 
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to confusing goals (Bai & Xu, 2005). Should managers maximize profits, minimize 
salaries, or maximize employment? Furthermore, Williamson (1999) submits that low-
powered incentives to managers are a defining feature of state organization, a feature 
that will guarantee probity (e.g. managers may not be too incentivized to increase 
profits at the expense of more general social objectives). 
Monitoring in public bureaucracies is also challenging (Alchian, 1965; De Alessi, 
1980). Many activities in the public sector involve multiple principals dispersed across 
various domains (Dixit, 2002; Moe, 1984). For instance, if the objective of an SOE is to 
maximize social welfare, it is not clear who the relevant stakeholder is: Is it society as a 
whole? Is it the citizens of the city where the company operates? Or, is it the workers of 
the company themselves?  State organizations also lack a well-defined group of 
monitors, such as shareholders actively participating in corporate boards. In fact, 
governments may appoint politicians or politically-connected actors to ―monitor‖ SOEs, 
thereby leading to the fundamental question of ―who monitors the monitors‖ or ―who 
guards the guardians‖ (Cabral & Lazzarini, 2010; Hurwicz, 2008). Unlike shareholders 
of private firms, those appointed board members do not have their wealth at stake 
when executing their monitoring duties. In addition, managers in SOEs do not have the 
threat of a hostile takeover when they underperform relative to their peers, and do not 
face risk of bankruptcy because they know the government will recapitalize or bail out 
the company if it becomes insolvent (Shleifer, 1998; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988).               
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Agency considerations have been largely employed to explain the empirical 
finding that SOEs with majority state control usually underperform private companies 
(e.g. Boardman & Vining, 1989; Chong & Lopez-de-Silanes, 2005; Kikeri, Nellis, & 
Shirley, 1992; La Porta & López-de-Silanes, 1999; Yiu, Bruton, & Lu, 2005); for a review, 
see Megginson and Netter (2001). What then can be said about the hybrid mode where 
Leviathan is a minority investor? Because in that hybrid mode the state does not directly 
control the firms, we should generally expect that the aforementioned agency problems 
will be less intense in private companies in which the government is only a minority 
investor, compared to state-controlled SOEs. However, there may be residual interference 
in PPFs or firms in which the government has minority stakes. Governments may 
participate in coalitions with other shareholders so as to appoint politically-connected 
managers and influence decisions based on considerations other than efficiency, 
potentially attenuating managerial incentives and making it more difficult to attract 
high-skilled personnel. Thus, agency problems in the hybrid mode should be at 
intermediate levels between the polar modes of full state control and private ownership. 
Some studies of privatization and PPFs confirm that in some performance dimensions 
they fare better than state-owned, but not necessarily better than private companies 
(Boardman & Vining, 1989; Majumdar, 1998).   
State capacity to coordinate the economy and attain social goals 
The industrial policy and social views emphasize that state ownership can help 
solve market failure and attain social objectives beyond pure profit maximization. 
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According to these views, the overall desire to coordinate economic development will 
therefore mandate some form of ―entrepreneurial‖ governmental action. Arguably, 
SOEs with full state control can be a vehicle to foster long-term, fixed investments and 
establish myriad industrial ―linkages‖ by fiat. Indeed, many authors note that the late 
industrialization of countries in Latin America and South Asia involved some form of 
direct governmental action through SOEs (Di John 2009; Jones & Sakong, 1980; Trebat, 
1983; Wade, 1990).     
As for the hybrid mode of Leviathan as a minority investor, the government‘s 
capacity to implement such coordination will depend on the residual interference in 
firms where the state has minority stakes. When governments invest in or lend to 
multiple private firms without any concerted action with majority shareholders, their 
ability to influence decisions will not be much greater than it would be in the context of 
privately-owned, autonomous firms mostly focused on profit maximization. However, 
as noted before, governments may form coalitions with other owners and therefore 
influence decision making more indirectly. Because such coalitions are not always 
possible, the mode where Leviathan is a minority shareholder should yield moderate 
ability for governments to intervene, compared to the mode where SOEs are pervasive.   
Level of (public-private) cronyism 
Recall our previous discussion of cronyism as a mechanism through which 
politically-connected private actors receive favors from the state. In the stylized mode 
where Leviathan is a majority investor, the pervasiveness of state-controlled SOEs 
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implies that there will be fewer private actors who can directly benefit from state 
initiatives. Although state bureaucrats and their cronies can establish mutual ties for 
their own benefit, most allocations will be influenced by and within the state through 
state bureaus and state-controlled corporations. China is an example, with several state-
owned firms whose managers are closely tied to the government and to the Communist 
Party  (Lin & Milhaupt, 2011). 
In contrast, in the Leviathan as a minority investor mode, the presence of several 
private, controlling owners whose firms largely draw from state capital magnifies the 
opportunities for cronyism. Consider, for instance, the case of subsidized loans by 
development banks. In cases where banks provide massive amounts of capital to 
industry and where subsidized interest rates are much lower than market rates, the 
benefit to invest in connections to attract cheap capital increases substantially. For 
instance, Lazzarini, Musacchio, Bandeira-de-Mello and Marcon (2012) find that 
allocations by Brazil‘s BNDES depend on whether firms donated to elected political 
candidates, and that those allocations do not have a consistent effect on observed firm-
level investment decisions. In other words, subsidized state capital may be channeled to 
politically-connected capitalists who could probably attract capital elsewhere. 
Therefore, the more extensive and permeable public-private interface that 
prevails when Leviathan is a minority investor suggests that the level of cronyism will 
tend to be more prevalent in this hybrid mode. In the polar mode where the state is a 
majority investor, most allocations actually flow within the state apparatus. The latter, 
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in turn, should be more prone to crony ties than the stylized mode of private ownership 
with minimal state interference. 
Flexibility of allocations (ease of entry and exit) 
Private ownership with minimal state interference is often associated with an 
inherent ability to churn out new entrepreneurial firms while at the same time avoiding 
the persistence of unproductive incumbents (Ahroni, 1986; Baumol, Litan, & Schramm, 
2007; Bremmer, 2010). A key aspect of this mode, in its stylized form, is a low level of 
entry and exit barriers, thereby facilitating flexible adjustments to changing conditions 
(e.g. technological disruptions or the emergence of more competitive foreign players). 
Such flexible adjustments are more difficult under state capitalism. Governments may 
want to shield domestic firms and SOEs against foreign competition, or build national 
champions with the use of subsidized credit and import tariffs. As suggested by the 
path dependence view, such interventions likely have persistent effects. Furthermore, 
given that direct state involvement is more pervasive in the majority Leviathan mode, 
flexible adjustments will be easier when Leviathan is a minority investor—even though 
the existence of political connections will create entry and exit barriers superior to the 
pure private ownership mode. For instance, cronyism has been used as one of the 
explanations for the bail out of large private groups in East Asia after the crisis of 1997 
(Kang, 2002). 
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Which factors influence the emergence of each mode of state capitalism? 
Given the previous discussion on the advantages and drawbacks of the various 
forms of state capitalism, a natural question is: which conditions will make a given 
mode more suitable?  By ―suitable,‖ we mean the degree to which each mode will allow 
for long-term economic development and firm-level performance, after taking into 
account existing constraints posed by country-level institutions and historical 
conditions. Figure 6 summarizes our main arguments, which are expanded below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Varieties of State Capitalism: Conditions Affecting the Prevalence of Each 
Mode. 
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Conditions that should favor the prevalence of each mode: 
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Conditions which favor the mode of Leviathan as a majority investor 
Pressure towards improved managerial profile of SOEs.  The performance of the 
majority Leviathan mode should largely increase when governments prioritize the 
selection of professional, competent, and public-minded managers. A clear hypothesis 
coming from studies of public organizations follows the Weberian idea that 
bureaucracies perform best when public managers are skilled, technical professionals 
free of political interference (Ahroni, 1986; Amsden, 1989; Lioukas, Bourantas, & 
Papadakis, 1993; Miller, 2000; Schneider, 1991).  Management of SOEs, in this view, will 
be delegated to public servants with a sense of duty and with preferences towards 
rectitude and professionalism (Wilson, 1989).  Although such delegation may at first 
glance exacerbate the agency problem—i.e. professional managers will be less 
accountable to their governments—managerial autonomy may create incentives for the 
development of a competent, skilled bureaucratic class with long careers in their own 
industry.  Trebat (1983, p. 79) claims that ―a competent staff can develop, over time, a 
reputation for professionalism that discourages interference by less-well-trained civil 
servants in the ministry.‖ Furthermore, skilled technical professionals may over time 
develop distinctive competencies in their industry or activity (Klein, Mahoney, 
McGahan, & Pitelis, 2011); autonomy will thus beget further learning and 
specialization.    
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Pressure toward improved governance of SOEs. The Leviathan as a majority investor 
mode can also be improved with programs to reform corporate governance of SOEs. 
These firms may more generally mimic the governance practices of privately owned 
firms—as proclaimed by the so-called New Public Management view of state 
organizations (Barberis, 1998; Flores-Macias & Musacchio, 2009; Lane, 2000). Thus, 
managerial delegation to technical professionals may be accompanied by either the 
introduction of salaries with bonuses or prizes based on meeting specific goals, or 
promotions within the government based on merit.  In China, for instance, 
performance-contingent contracts for SOE managers are common (Bai & Xu, 2005; 
Mengistae & Xu, 2004).  Public listing of SOEs through the sale of minority state 
shareholdings may additionally improve the governance of SOEs because it should 
reveal company-level information and allow external investors to more effectively 
monitor SOEs. Thus, analyzing data from Indian SOEs, Gupta (2005) finds that 
(minority) public listing improves sales, profits, and productivity.13   
Likewise, states can reform the corporate governance of SOEs by creating boards 
with skilled, independent external members who improve monitoring of management 
performance. Kole and Mulherin (1997), for instance, analyze an interesting event in the 
United States when the government took over subsidiaries of enemy countries during 
and after World War II. They find no significant differences between those government-
                                                 
 
13 Gupta (2005) refers to the sale of minority stakes by the government as ―partial privatization.‖  
In our usage of the term, however, partially privatized firms are those in which majority control is sold to 
private owners. 
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owned firms and private counterparts in similar sectors. To explain this result, they 
note that the government crafted new boards with a more ―hands-off, supervisory role‖ 
(p. 8), while at the same time retaining technical managers to assure that each business 
will be subject to ―the supervision of men familiar with its operations‖ (p. 9).      
Reforms to improve governance of SOEs also mandate changes in laws that 
effectively protect minority shareholders.  Thus, if governments pursue a double 
bottom line, then their influence on SOEs may harm those shareholders (e.g. keeping 
prices low to curb inflation, at the expense of reduced firm-level profitability).  
Pargendler (2012) discusses these risks in detail and offers some policy 
recommendations. 
Degree of within-sector competition. Majority state control may be better suited to 
firms in sectors characterized by a high degree of competition. Several authors have 
stressed that the efficiency of SOEs may be affected by their competitive environment 
(Bartel & Harrison, 2005; Boardman & Vining, 1989; Caves & Christensen, 1980; Lioukas 
et al., 1993; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988).  When SOEs have to compete for contracts or 
clients, there is less room for excessive governmental interference because otherwise 
they will have less resources and leeway to invest and respond to market pressure.   
Consistent with this hypothesis, Bartel and Harrison‘s (2005) empirical analysis of 
private and public firms in Indonesia reveals that ―there may be an agency problem 
associated with public-sector ownership, but only when firms are given access to 
government financing or protected from import competition or foreign ownership‖ (p. 
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142).  They point out that reforms along the lines of enhancing competitive pressure for 
SOEs can be a useful and perhaps easier to implement in countries with strong 
objections against privatization. 
Shallow capital markets. The industrial policy view submits that governmental 
action at the industrial level will be particularly useful when shallow, underdeveloped 
capital markets preclude private entrepreneurial action. In our view, shallow capital 
markets not only make it difficult for firms to access capital, but they also make it 
harder for investors to obtain company-level information to help them monitor and 
discipline managers. For instance, in countries with developed stock markets, investors 
have access to company information regularly. Moreover, stock markets with active 
investors and high liquidity reduce agency problems by making managers worried 
about possible takeover threats. For this reason, less developed capital markets make 
takeovers less likely and magnify governance conflicts (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Nenova, 
2005). Thus, the benefits of the majority Leviathan mode will tend to increase in 
countries at very early stages of capital market development. Lending some support for 
this claim, Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik‘s (1998) comparison of state-owned and private 
banks in India conclude that, in the absence of well-functioning capital markets, private 
companies are not unambiguously superior to SOEs.  As noted before, Bortolotti, 
Fantini and Siniscalco (2004) also find that privatization tends to be positively 
associated with developed financial markets. 
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Pressures or desires to create industrial sectors that pursue a “double bottom line.”  
SOEs will also allow governments to pursue policies that create ―double bottom line‖ to 
managers.  As implied by the agency perspective, private companies will have a hard 
time attracting and incentivizing skilled managers when objectives are multiple and 
diffuse.  For instance, state-owned banks may be created to support governmental 
policies promoting cheap credit or targeted capital to certain sectors (Yeyati et al., 2004).  
―Resource‖ sectors such as mining or oil extraction also tend to exhibit double-bottom 
line behavior because governments often treat these sectors as ―strategic‖: managers of 
those firms are supposed not only to pursue profitability, but also use the proceeds 
from mineral extraction to develop vertically-linked industries (e.g. equipment, 
shipping, etc.) or to support social redistribution programs.14   
Conditions that favor the mode of Leviathan as a minority investor 
Moderately shallow capital markets.  We use the qualifier ―moderately‖ because, 
without some degree of capital market development, governments may not have at their 
disposal an emerging private sector with established mechanisms to channel resources 
and monitor their investments—as is the case, for instance, when state-owned funds 
invest in publicly listed shares. However, as capital markets become more developed, 
the benefits of government investments in minority positions in private firms will likely 
diminish. Firms will more and more have access to external financing and alternative 
                                                 
14 Sometimes, however, the double-bottom argument is inefficiently used by governments for 
political gain.  The so-called resource curse literature, for instance, argues that governments may control 
country-specific natural resources to implement populist initiatives and support corrupt deals (for a 
review, see Di John 2009; Frankel, 2010).   
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forms of capitalization (e.g. IPOs, publicly traded debentures, depository receipts, 
among others). We thus submit that the Leviathan as a minority investor mode will be 
more appropriate in intermediate stages of capital market development. For instance, 
Inoue, Lazzarini and Musacchio (2012) find that the positive effect of minority equity 
allocations by the Brazilian Development Bank, BNDES, on firm performance and 
investment was significant in the 1990s, but diminished thereafter. They argue that one 
of the likely explanations is that capital markets in Brazil grew more rapidly after 2003 
and their regulation improved since 2001 (e.g., the ratio of stock market capitalization to 
GDP in Brazil jumped from 19 percent in 1995 to 73 percent in 2009).    
Restrained cronyism. Minority state ownership of firms will likely work best in 
countries with a well-established bureaucratic ethos of professionalism and public-
mindedness. This is because, as Ades and DiTella (1999) show in their theoretical 
model, there is risk of having corruption when bureaucrats are in charge of selecting 
national champions that receive government favors (e.g., subsidized credit). That is why 
the literature on bureaucrats and industrial policy emphasizes that importance of 
having a skilled technical staff with superior analytical capabilities and a sense of 
professionalism in their policy-making duties behind the decision of where to invest 
government money (Evans, 1995; Schneider, 1991).  Wade (1990, p. 225) posits that, in 
Taiwan, ―industrial policy-making and implementation have been done largely by 
people trained in engineering and, at senior levels, with close knowledge of Japan‘s 
industrial policies.‖ Authors such as Amsden (1989) and Rodrik (2004) also stress the 
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importance of planning and clear indicators (e.g. firm-level export performance) to 
decide whether private targets deserve or not extended support.  With transparent 
criteria to define targets and disciplining mechanisms to halt capital injections in case of 
poor performance, the negative effect of cronyism in the minority Leviathan mode 
should be greatly reduced.  
Public opposition towards full-fledged privatization and/or desire to promote national 
champions.  The path dependence view discussed earlier suggests that large-scale, 
outright privatization may not be palatable to the public opinion.  Thus, the mode 
where Leviathan is a minority investor will likely occur in settings where governments 
are pressured to increase the efficiency of public enterprises through private 
management but when, at the same time, governments want to signal to the public that 
they are not completely neglecting their role as providers of capital and agents of 
economic development.  State investments in minority equity positions, therefore, 
should be common in countries with preferences towards building national champions 
with some degree of governmental support (see e.g. Bremmer, 2010, p. 67).   
Pressure to improve corporate governance of private firms with minority state capital. 
Minority state ownership of firms can be suitable in situations where certain corporate 
structures, particularly pyramidal business groups, are avoided. Since Leff‘s (1978) 
original contribution, scholars have proposed that business groups—i.e., collections of 
firms under the same controlling entity—provide credit-constrained firms with 
financing opportunities that flow through internal capital markets (Khanna & Palepu, 
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1997, 2000; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003).  But if capital markets 
internal to groups substitute for the need for external financing, we should expect 
governmental capital to be more effective when target firms are not affiliated to groups. 
The latter should be relatively more constrained in their investment opportunities than 
firms that have access to internal, group-level capital.   
Moreover, groups tend to magnify the risk of minority shareholder 
expropriation. Here the agency problem occurs the other way around: instead of a 
majority Leviathan creating management conflicts, the state will be a minority investor 
who can be expropriated by majority private owners. This will likely occur when private 
groups are organized as complex pyramids involving firms that have stakes in other 
firms and so successively (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005). Thus, state capital may 
be ―tunneled‖ through complex pyramids to support controlling owners‘ private 
projects or rescue struggling internal units (Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Bertrand, Mehta, & 
Mullainathan, 2002). The government may thus benefit a group‘s majority owners 
without necessarily improving the performance of the companies in which it invests. 
Furthermore, while credit-constrained firms may be able bolster fixed investments with 
the help of governmental capital allocations, tunneling within business groups implies 
that new allocations may be redirected for reasons other than to support those fixed 
investments. Consistent with this hypothesis, Giannetti and Laeven (2009) and Inoue, 
Lazzarini and Musacchio (2012) find that the positive performance effect of minority 
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state equity—via pension funds and development banks respectively—is reduced when 
target firms belong to business groups. 
Conditions that favor privately-owned firms 
It is also useful to close our argument by discussing how those identified 
conditions would affect the choice of a more market-oriented, privately-owned mode of 
economic organization. We already discussed that well-developed capital markets 
diminish the benefits of state interventions to infuse capital in the economy; thus, the 
mode of pure private ownership works best when capital markets are widely 
developed. Furthermore, this mode is appropriate for industrial sectors and activities 
with ―single bottom line;‖ think, for instance, of consumer goods or retail companies 
where objective indicators such as profitability and sales are straightforward 
performance dimensions. Finally, governments that are able to craft effective regulatory 
systems should be less dependent on direct or indirect state investments to improve 
infrastructure or promote certain sectors, while at the same time avoiding distortions 
that might occur when firms neglect performance dimensions valued by the population  
(Bortolotti & Perotti, 2007). For instance, examining events of telecom privatization in 
Africa and Latin America, Wallsten (2001) observes that while privatization in tandem 
with effective regulatory systems appear to improve a host of service performance 
dimensions, privatization alone results in lower service penetration to the population 
(i.e. the capacity of the network to connect several lines).      
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Concluding remarks 
This paper makes three general arguments. First, state capitalism in the twenty-
first century combines majority ownership of SOEs with a hybrid form that includes 
minority equity investments as well as other forms of support for private firms (e.g., 
subsidized loans). Second, all of those forms are present around the world, both in rich 
and poor countries, and in most cases they co-exist. Although some countries appear to 
have a prevalence of the minority investor mode (e.g. Brazil, India) while other 
countries emphasize the majority mode (e.g. Russia, China), in most cases the two 
modes jointly occur.  Three, the emergence of those modes is explained by a host of 
environmental, political and historical factors; and the economic performance of each 
mode will depend on certain contingencies that should affect their benefits and costs 
(e.g. the economic distortions that they may generate).  We carefully identify those 
contingencies, in light of recent theoretical and empirical developments in the field. 
Our discussion opens several avenues for further research. For instance, for the 
Leviathan as a majority investor mode, most of the literature on SOEs focused on 
showing how those firms underperformed private companies. Yet there is significant 
variation in the performance of SOEs even within the same industry; and research 
explaining that variation is surprisingly scant. Our previous discussion suggests some 
factors that can help explain such performance heterogeneity (e.g. managerial and 
governance features of SOEs), but much more work is need to improve our 
understanding of when and in which conditions some SOEs will outperform other 
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SOEs and even private firms.  This point is important because some countries are 
reluctant to privatize certain SOEs in certain ―strategic‖ sectors.  In those conditions, the 
Leviathan as a majority investor mode is a given, and hence the exercise is to find ways 
to make it work.   
When it comes to Leviathan as a minority investor mode, there is also a long list 
of unanswered questions. For instance, when do government investments in minority 
equity positions improve firm performance or allow firms to invest in projects they 
would not otherwise pursue? Are these minority equity investments more effective 
when financial markets are more developed or when corporate governance regulation 
is stricter? Which particular conduit of minority investment is more appropriate, given 
that myriad channels are available for governments (e.g. development banks, pension 
funds, sovereign wealth funds, and so on)?  How to reduce the potential for cronyism 
that can accompany such minority allocations?  How to manage partially privatized 
firms?   We hope that the discussion present here will stimulate novel research to 
advance our understanding by answering these and other questions raised by the recent 
dissemination of varied forms of state capitalism.  
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APPENDIX 
Sources to Study the Patterns of State Ownership in Emerging Markets 
Country Source 
Brazil -Data on the number of majority- and minority-owned companies (for the federal 
government only), and the share of SOE output to GDP comes from ―Estado Ltda.‖ Época, 
November 6, 2011. 
-The number of SOEs listed and their importance relative to stock market capitalization are 
based on our calculations and consider only the largest 100 companies. All data from 
Capital IQ. 
China -Share of SOE output to GDP from OECD, ―State-Owned Enterprises in China: Reviewing 
the Evidence.‖ Paris: OECD, January 2009, p. 6.  
-Szamosszegi, Andrew and Cole Kyle. ―An Analysis of State-Owned Enterprises and State 
Capitalism in China.‖ Document prepared by Capital Trade, Inc. for the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington D.C., 2011. 
-The number of SOEs listed and their importance relative to stock market capitalization also 
come from the OECD study, p. 16, and are based on data from 2004. 
 
Egypt - The number of SOEs is calculating by subtracting the number of privatized, leased and 
liquidated firms from the total number of companies under government control when the 
privatization program started in 1991. Mohammed Omran, ―Ownership Structure: Trends 
and Changes Following Privatisation in Egypt.‖ Power point presented at the OECD Second 
Meeting of Working Group 5 on Corporate Governance, Rabat, September 2005, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/50/0,3746,en_34645207_34645863_35395890_1_1_1_1,00.h
tml 
-The number of minority-owned companies (calculated using the ownership share of state-
owned holding companies after privatization) from ―Privatization in Egypt. Quarterly 
Review, April-June 2002.‖ Mimeo, Carana Corporation, 2002, available at  
http://www1.aucegypt.edu/src/wsite1/Pdfs/Privatization%20in%20Egypt%20-
Quarterly%20Review.pdf  
India -Most data from OECD, ―State Owned Enterprises in India: Reviewing the Evidence.‖ Paris: 
OECD, January 29, 2009. 
-The number of SOEs listed and their importance relative to stock market capitalization are 
based on our calculations and consider only the largest 100 companies. Data for 2009. All 
data from Capital IQ. 
-Data on state level public enterprises from India. Department of Public Enterprises. 
―National Survey on State Level Public Enterprises (2006-2007),‖ 2007, available at   
http://dpe.nic.in/newgl/SLPErep0607.pdf  
-Minority-owned companies correspond to the number of firms in which the Life Insurance 
Corporation of India (LIC), a majority-owned SOE, holds minority positions. Data on 
holdings from LIC from Bloomberg, www.bloomberg.com, accessed on January 10, 2012. 
Indonesia -Number of SOEs and minority-owned SOEs come from Andriati Fitriningrum, ―Indonesia 
Experiences in Managing the State Companies,‖ Power point presentation at the OECD-
Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, Singapore, May, 
2006, available at http://dpe.nic.in/newgl/SLPErep0607.pdf 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/22/37339611.pdf  
-Listed SOEs to Stock market capitalization from Rajasa, Hatta. ―State of Indonesian State 
Owned Enterprises,‖ Soverign Wealth Fund Institute web site, August, 2011, available at  
http://www.swfinstitute.org/swf-news/state-of-indonesian-state-owned-enterprises/  
Mexico -Data for Mexico comes from Kikeri, Sunita and Kolo, Aishetu Fatima , Privatization: Trends 
and Recent Developments (November 2005). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
62 
 
No. 3765. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=849344   
Malaysia -Data from Khazanah Nasional. ―Seventh Khazanah Annual Review,‖ 18 January 2011, 
power point available at 
http://www.khazanah.com.my/docs/30June2011_investment_structure.pdf, accessed 
February 10, 2012.  
Russia -Number of SOEs, number of SOEs listed and percentage of market capitalization from 
Carsten Sprenger. ―State-Owned Enterprises in Russia,‖ PowerPoint presentation at the 
OECD Roundtable on Corporate Governance of SOEs, Moscow, October, 2008. Traded 
companies exclude minority-owned firms. 
-The number of federal and municipal SOEs and minority-owned SOEs come from Carsten 
Sprenger, "State Ownership in the Russian Economy: Its Magnitude, Structure and 
Governance Problems." Mimeo Higher School of Economics, Moscow, February 2010, pp. 5–
8. The number of majority- and minority-owned firms is underestimated as it only accounts 
for direct ownership stakes, i.e., it does take into account ownership stakes of companies 
that are, in turn, controlled by the Russian government. The number of state/local firms 
includes only municipal companies.  
South 
Africa 
Report ―An analysis of the financial performance of state owned enterprises,‖ available at 
www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=95671, accessed on March 12, 2012. 
Thailand -SOE output to GDP estimated using net income of the Thai SOEs and GDP for 2004. SOE 
data from Ruangrong, Pallapa. ―ARGC Task Force on Corporate Governance of SOEs: The 
Case of Thailand.‖ Power point presentation, May 20, 2005, available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/28/34972513.ppt  
Turkey -Output to GDP represents net profits to GDP comes from 2007 Public Enterprise Report,  p. 
19; the number of local level SOEs comes from p. 208. Our data on the number of federal 
SOEs and the distinction between minority and majority-owned companies comes from the 
lists on pp. 12, 189–190, 201, and 248–250. For our counts we exclude financial firms such as 
banks or leasing and factoring companies owned by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund 
(known as TMSF). The number of minority firms refers to those controlled by the federal 
government, so out of 141 federal SOEs, 67 are minority owned. All data from Republic of 
Turkey. Directorate General of State Owned Enterprises. 2007 Public Enterprises Report, 
august 2008, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.tr/irj/go/km/docs/documents/Treasury%20Web/Research&D
ata... 
.../Reports/State%20Owned%20Enterprises%20Reports/2007_Public_Enterprises_Report.p
df  
Vietnam -The number of minority-owned companies represents the ―Joint stock Co. with capital of 
State‖ category from Vietnam. General Statistics Office, Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2010, 
p. 181, available at 
http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=515&idmid=5&ItemID=11974 
-Data on the number of SOEs and their output to GDP from the General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam‘s web page and, available at http://www.gso.gov.vn/, accessed February 10, 2012. 
 
